Congédiement déguisé: un directeur des opérations reçoit une indemnité de départ de 21 mois

Par Me Paul-Matthieu Grondin, avec la collaboration de Mariane Judge

Dans une décision de la Cour supérieure de 2012, Floyd c. Escher-Grad Inc., un employé prétend avoir été victime d’un congédiement déguisé.

Après 21 ans de service, l’employeur l’avise qu’il est mis à pied pour une période indéterminée en raison de problèmes économiques de l’entreprise. Il n’a rien reçu à titre d’indemnité de départ et aucun des employés mis à pied n’a été rappelé pour un retour au travail.

L’employé est lui-même devenu entrepreneur,  conseillant notamment des clients de son ancien employeur, ce qui convenait à ce dernier.

L’employé prétend avoir été victime d’un congédiement déguisé en raison de changements substantiels à des éléments essentiels de son contrat de travail. Il ajoute n’avoir eu aucune indication de la part de l’employeur qu’il allait être licencié. Il n’a également jamais été question d’un retour à l’emploi.

L’employeur soutient qu’il n’a jamais mis fin à l’emploi de l’employé, mais qu’il a simplement été mis à pied de façon temporaire.

Le tribunal estime que l’employé a bien été victime d’un congédiement injustifié lorsque l’employeur a modifié ses conditions de travail de façon substantielle et unilatérale, puisque la mise à pied n’était pas temporaire, au final. Le juge accorde donc une indemnité de 21 mois selon les critères usuels.

Voyez la façon dont le juge motive sa décision :

[59] The Court finds that in the present case, Plaintiff’s layoff on April 6th, 2009 was indeed a constructive dismissal by Escher, bringing the employment contract between Plaintiff and Defendant to an end.

[…]

[64] Applying these principles to the present case, it appears clear that the employer Escher, in April 2009, made unilateral and unexpected changes to the employment contract entered into with Plaintiff without his consent, suspending him without pay and even failing to remit to him unpaid salary, severance, vacation pay, expenses and commissions, thereby contravening its obligations to Plaintiff pursuant to article 2087 CCQ.

[65] To use the terminology of the Supreme Court in Farber, a reasonable person in the same situation as Mr. Floyd, would have eventually realized, as he did, that he was being permanently terminated rather than temporarily laid off, especially once his calls to Mr. Khalid were not returned, as essential terms of his employment contract (duties and responsibilities, pay, expense reimbursement, commissions etc.) had been substantially and unilaterally changed by his employer without his consent.

[66] Nevertheless, although the Court finds that Mr. Floyd was constructively dismissed in April 2009, it is also clear that he did not realize or acknowledge his constructive dismissal until some weeks later. In fact, it appears that he initially accepted or rather hoped that his layoff might indeed be “temporary”.

[…]

[68] In other words, in the language of the Farber decision cited above, Plaintiff was constructively dismissed in April 2009, even though he only realized that he had been dismissed some weeks later, when he effectively “resigned” from the Company as a result.

[…]

[90] While Justice Bich underlines that each case must be decided on its particular facts, there are several similarities between the present case and the decision in Aksich which justify the claim here for 21 months of termination pay. Mr. Floyd had 21 years of consecutive employment, while Mr. Aksich had 20 years. Mr. Floyd was an excellent employee, greatly appreciated by his employer, as was Mr. Aksich. Both were in upper middle-management and both were approximately the same age (late forties vs early fifties). Both had generous salaries – Plaintiff more than $92,000 plus benefits, and Mr. Aksich more than $120,000. Both were terminated without cause and in both cases, despite mitigation attempts, comparable employment was not to be found.

[91] The Court therefore concludes that the amount of $141,409.25 claimed by Plaintiff, representing 21 months of his base salary minus revenues from Phoenix (Exhibit P-79), is well-founded. However, the undersigned will also deduct the entire dividend of $36,633 paid to Plaintiff and his wife by Phoenix in June 2010, deeming the entire dividend to be a beneficial payment to Plaintiff as his wife was not a shareholder of Phoenix at that time.